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Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff demonstrate the complex realities
surrounding religious and political arguments concerning the need for a consistent
ethical rationale for determining the proper presence of religious principles in
political debate. Their arguments highlight the contemporary dialogue between
political liberalism and theologically based responses. Both authors defend the
legitimacy of liberal democracy, but differ on the epistemological basis for
interpretation and implementation of church-state relations within government
law and policies.
Robert Audi makes extensive use of notes for qualifying numerous points. He
draws on works by others and also by himself, including his new book Religious
Commitmentand Secular Reason (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
Nicholas Wolterstorff uses only eighteen notes, compared to Audi's seventy-eight,
and identifies his epistemological study entitled John Locke and the Ethics of Belief
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996)as a basis for significant aspects of
his argument.
Audi's essay argues that the separationist principle of neutrality is applicable
both to government and to individual religious citizens. The obligation for
morally upright citizens to be politically responsible is fulfilled within a liberal
democratic society by following what he calls a "theo-ethical equilibrium,"
composed of an overlap between certain moral and civic virtues. This equilibrium
acts as an independent guide to moral rights and religious obligations of a religious
person while he or she participates in political processes involving coercive laws
and policies. When endorsing a coercive action, religious citizens and institutions
must have at least one adequatelyjustifiable freestandingsecular rationale. In other
words, no coercive action may be endorsed on religious authority alone if there
is lacking a corresponding secular rationale and motivation. Essentially, Audi
transforms the Constitution's first-amendment restraint on Congress into an ethic
of self-restraint for religious individuals and institutions.
Nicholas Wolterstorff responds that Audi assumes the separation principle to
be inherent in, and the restriction principle implied in, the concept of liberal
democracy. Further interaction by the authors on this aspect would have greatly
enhanced the book. If the two principles were not inherent to liberal democracy,
would liberal democracy still be liberal? Wolterstorff believes so: liberal
democracy imposes no such ethical constraints.
Wolterstorff's first essay penetratingly analyzes the epistemological basis
of the liberal rationale for the "religious-reason restraint" in political debate as
articulated in the two most influential versions of the liberal position, namely,

the traditional (John Locke) and the contemporary (John Rawls). Wolterstorff
concludes that no one, including Locke himself, ever successfully developed a
science of morality and Locke's countercritique of his own position effectively
undermined the basis of his rationale.
Wolterstorff then assessesRawls's position that political decisions and discussions
are based on what the consmuspopuli yields as the guiding principles. Wolterstorff
effectively counters that a consensus of everyone is out of the question, because
unreasonable persons make it impossible for all to agree on what is reasonable.
Wolterstorff rightly insists that the liberal requirement to restrain the role
of religion in political considerations is an inequitable infringement on the free
exercise of religion and ignores the cruel brutalities of modern comprehensive
secular ideologies. He argues for politics in which individuals listen t o others
and their particularities. This means discarding the liberal principles of religious
restraint except in the manner, laws and provisions, and goal of political justice
in public discussion and debate-matters applicable to all citizens. Wolterstorff
calls his perspective the consocial position, which agrees with the liberal position
but rejects the "religious reason restraintn principle and interprets the neutrality
principle of the Constitution as requiring government to impartially treat
religion.
Audi's essay and response reveal his excellent ability to differentiateand qualhy
Wolterstorff's positions as much as his own. His position is well developed and
sensitive both to the need for religious involvement in political discussion and to the
potential for coercion. Audi makes it clear that his position is much less restrictive
on the role of religious reasons in political matters than those versions Wolterstorff
addresses-a point the latter concedes while adjusting the line of his argument to
include Audi's version. Wolterstorff aims at resolving the theoreticalparadoxesof the
liberal position in order to harmonize the theory of liberal democracy with the
reality that all liberal democracies are more or less liberal democracies. As a result, he
seems indifferent to the potential of religious coercion through political means.
Wolterstorff's focus on paradoxes limits his articulation of the practical
ramifications of his consocial position. His interpretation of neutrality as
impartiality has merit for resolving the inequitable economic burden that religious
parents assume in providing religious education for their children. However, he
fails to explain the paradoxes that impartiality raises in other church-state issues.
For instance, how does impartiality operate equitably in the public school system
for religious parents who want religious education for their children in the public
schools?Furthermore, in exchange for the unrestricted involvement of religious
reasons in public debate and economic equality for religious schools,
representatives and educators must assume the burden of competence in religious
mitters, a burden the founding fathers considered the officers of the state as
incompetent to bear. To be fair, Wolterstorff attempts a daunting task by
addressing the paradoxes of liberalism and by redefining liberal democracy as
consocial in light of the fact that liberalism in the United States has'had several
centuries of studied refinement.
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